Moreover, bmi accounts for less than [10-20]% of demand for third party line maintenance at Barcelona El Prat and therefore its addition to IAG's portfolio would not change its current incentive to continue supplying third parties at the above-mentioned airport.
The majority of the respondents in the market investigation also indicated that purchasers of MRO services could easily switch (i.e. in a limited time frame and at a reasonable cost) to alternative providers at any given British or Spanish airport. [258]
As regards the Parties, with the exception of bmi’s line maintenance contract with Lufthansa, all contracts operate on a rolling basis (i.e. they continue until terminated by either party). Moreover, the termination periods for line maintenance contracts are regulated by the relevant International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations, providing inter alia that all such contracts are terminable on maximum 60 days’ notice.
In relation to customer foreclosure concerns, the merged entity would not have the ability to foreclose other suppliers of line maintenance services at Barcelona El Prat. As mentioned above, bmi's share of purchases of line maintenance services at Barcelona El Prat is limited. As a consequence, third party suppliers of line maintenance would continue to have a range of alternative customers to whom they can provide their services.
6.4. Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the market for MRO services.
Failing firm defence
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the case law of Court of Justice establish a three-pronged test to determine whether a "rescue merger" may be allowed (that is to say, a failing firm defence can be accepted) despite its adverse effects on competition:
the allegedly failing firm would, in the near future, be forced out of the market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another undertaking (see Section 2);
there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase than the notified merger (see Section 2); and
iii. in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market (see Section 3). [259]