It thus appears that in the counterfactual, bmi's exit would have heightened other carrier's incentives to enter the exited routes, at least to some extent. Besides, as explained above, the ability of these carriers to enter would have been heightened by the reallocation/sale of bmi's slots at Heathrow.
In conclusion, it appears that, post-Transaction, IAG would be likely to be less threatened by new entries on the routes where bmi currently operates than in the counterfactual. This is due to lower incentives and higher barriers to entry in the post-Transaction scenario than in the counterfactual.
It is against this counterfactual that the Commission assessed the effects of the Transaction on the relevant markets.
Another consequence of the counterfactual identified by the Commission is that issues relating to potential competition within the meaning of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, would not raise serious doubts as to the compatibility of the present Transaction with the internal market. Indeed, even if pre-Transaction, bmi would have been a potential entrant on routes operated by IAG, possibly acting as a kind of maverick constraining IAG, the counterfactual (i.e. bmi's market exit) would make such theory of harm irrelevant.
Treatment of alliance and code-share partners
Another issue regarding the conceptual framework for assessing the competitive impact of the Transaction relates to the treatment of airline alliances and codeshare partnerships.
2.1. Treatment of alliance partners
British Airways and Iberia are members of the oneworld alliance whereas bmi is a member of the Star alliance. Post-Transaction, the merged entity would be a member of the oneworld alliance.
In line with the Commission's earlier decisions [122] , IAG's alliance partners are not considered for the determination of affected markets except concerning routes and carriers concerned by the Transatlantic Joint Business. Pursuant to the Transatlantic Joint Business agreement, IAG and American Airlines have put in place extensive cooperation on their routes between Europe and North America, including revenue-sharing.
2.2. Treatment of codeshare partners
The Parties have currently no codeshare agreements between themselves.
British Airways and Iberia have codeshare relationships with a number of other carriers, notably members of the oneworld alliance.