, Commission Decision of 30/03/2012 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the co…

In force
201.

The majority of respondents to the market investigation (competitors, corporate customers, travel agencies) were of the opinion that the existing competitors on the route constitute a credible competitive alternative to the Parties' services on this route. Furthermore, a slight majority of the respondents indicated that the Parties would face sufficient constraint on this segment so as to prevent a price increase post-Transaction

202.

Therefore, the Parties would face no competitive constraint on a Heathrow-Aberdeen market and they would face some constraints from easyJet and FlyBe on London(three)-Aberdeen on the NTS passenger segment. On a London(five)-Aberdeen market, easyJet in particular (and to a more limited extent FlyBe) appear to exert a significant competitive constraint on the Parties on the NTS passenger segment.

1.4.1. (4) Entry/expansion

203.

Demand currently exceeds capacity throughout most or all of the day at Heathrow and Gatwick. On the contrary, Luton and Aberdeen are schedules facilitated airports.

204.

IAG considers that easyJet and FlyBe would be well placed to expand their current services on this route from their bases. Moreover, IAG submits that Air France with its CityJet, looks set to launch a new service to Aberdeen from City in the near future. [143] Other potential new entrants could be according to the Parties, Ryanair, Jet2, Aer Lingus and the potential buyer of bmi Regional (Granite).

205.

No likely, timely and sufficient entry capable of adding significant competitive pressure on the Parties post-Transaction has been identified. If any, new entries and frequency increases post-Transaction would take place from airports other than Heathrow. Therefore, entry would not appear as sufficient to deter or defeat the anticompetitive effect of the Transaction on the London-Aberdeen route.

1.4.1. (5) Conclusion on the London-Aberdeen route

206.

The effects of the Transaction on the London-Aberdeen route must be compared against the situation that would have prevailed on this route without the Transaction. As set out above in Section V.1, the Commission considers that, absent the Transaction, bmi would have exited this route and that IAG would likely have been more threatened by new entry on this route than in a post-Transaction scenario.