As regards the criterion related to the level of competition on routes for which slots are requested, ACL did not provide much detail about how it would apply concretely. Nevertheless, IAG specified that if absent the Transaction bmi were to become insolvent and a carrier were to ask for slots from the pool to operate on a route exited by bmi, the reduction in competition and consumers' choice due to bmi's exit from the route in question would be taken into consideration in the allocation of the slots [113] . Furthermore, in order to assess the competitive situation on a route, ACL would primarily consider airport pairs rather than city pairs. ACL specified in this respect that even the qualification of a carrier as a new entrant on a given intra Union route pursuant to Article 2 (b) of the EU Slot Regulation would not depend on whether services are offered on the same city pair but from different airports [114] .
These elements indicate that should bmi exit all markets, carriers other than IAG requesting slots from the pool for routes from Heathrow where IAG would enjoy a strong competitive position following bmi's exit would likely be granted a relatively high degree of priority. This would be likely the case in particular for the routes from Heathrow to Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Nice, and Basel, where IAG would enjoy a monopoly position following bmi's exit, but also routes from Heathrow to Moscow, Cairo and Riyadh, where IAG would hold a high market share. Similarly, carriers requesting slots for routes where IAG does not operate but where bmi currently enjoys a strong position would also be likely to be granted a high degree of priority.
If all or part of bmi's slots were to fall back to the pool, providing an accurate estimate of the share of the pool that IAG would obtain appears complex. As a very rough estimate ACL expects British Airways to obtain approximately 40 % of the slots' share destined to incumbents [115] , i.e. around 20% of the slots returned to the slot pool [116] .