According to IAG, in practice, the Spanish Nationality Entity has not exercised its voting rights contrary to the directions or recommendations of IAG and it is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which the Spanish Nationality Entity might legitimately vote contrary to IAG’s instructions. Also according to IAG, there are no issues where it is expected that the Spanish Nationality Entity might vote contrary to the instructions of IAG.
The JN recognises the particularities of corporate structures in the airline sector, where it states in paragraph 23 the "The concept of control under the Merger Regulation may be different from that applied in specific areas of Community and national legislation concerning, for example, (…) air transport (…)". Furthermore, the liberty of the Spanish Nationality Entity to vote contrary to IAG's instructions is confined to a limited number of cases (namely only when resolutions would be contrary to the Assurances, when they would result in the corporate structure no longer being compliant with the nationality requirements or when they would not be in the best interests of the Spanish national shareholders of IAG). Finally, even if the Spanish Nationality Entity would seek to vote contrary to the instructions of IAG, the final word would still be with IAG (through a decision of its shareholders' meeting). When taking all these elements on balance, it is concluded that IAG de facto has the power to exercise more than half of the voting rights in the IB Opco Holding shareholders' meeting, such that the criterion of Article 5(4)(b)(ii) of the Merger Regulation is satisfied. [14]
1.2. On the assumption that BA is the 'undertaking concerned'
In this situation, the turnover of Iberia should be added to that of BA under Article 5(4)(d) of the Merger Regulation, given that IAG owns more than half of the capital of BA and enjoys one or more of the powers and rights of Article 5(4)(b) of the Merger Regulation in Iberia (as discussed above).
Conclusion
On the basis of the above, it is concluded that such links as those provided for in Article 5(4) of the Merger Regulation exist between IAG, BA and Iberia, and that as a result, their turnovers must be added together for the purposes of determining jurisdiction under the Merger Regulation (and this regardless of whether IAG or BA would be the buyer).