Moreover, according to data provided by IAG [119] , the number of daily slot pairs traded on average at Heathrow in each IATA season since 2009 has always been lower than 14, which represents around one quarter of bmi's slot portfolio only. In addition, bmi itself, unlike IAG, has been a significant seller and lessor of slots since 2009. For example, it sold 6 of the 14 daily slot pairs sold or leased out on average in the winter 2011 season. These elements suggest that the volume of slots available through sales or leases post-Transaction is likely to be significantly lower than bmi's overall portfolio of slots (the security slots being excluded), which would be reallocated to other airlines in the counterfactual.
Furthermore, several respondents to the market investigation stated that if absent the Transaction bmi were to exit the market in the short term, they would consider entering some of the routes exited by bmi. UK domestic and European short-haul routes were specifically mentioned. According to two respondents, a precise list of routes cannot however be defined. One of them underlined that that any decision would be predicated by its interpretation of actual and anticipated market conditions at the time. However, according to another respondent, "an exit of any competitor from the market presents opportunity for entry, as long as the charges at the airport are of an acceptable level." [120] The recent conduct of IAG itself illustrates that the exit of a carrier from a route, including a UK domestic route, creates incentives for other carriers to either enter or expand on this route. Indeed, following bmi's exit from the Heathrow-Glasgow route in March 2011, IAG significantly increased capacity on this route where it was already present [121] . Moreover, the exit of a carrier from a route does not necessarily mean that there was room only for the other carriers operating on the route when such exit is triggered by insolvency instead of a route-specific exit decision.
The Transaction is not expected to have a similar effect on potential new entrant's incentives to enter/expand on routes as bmi's market exit because the Transaction would not translate into a clear and immediate reduction in capacity on the routes where bmi currently operates. Indeed, other carriers' incentives to enter on relevant routes would appear to be more limited than in the counterfactual.