[220] "The Proposed Acquisition of British Midland International's Mainline business by International Airlines Group: Economic considerations", Charles River Associates, 15 February 2012, Annex 2
[221] Proposed Acquisition of bmi, IAG, January 2012 and IAG's reply to the request for information of 14 February 2012
[222] Decision 2007/339/EC of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union meeting within the Council, of 25 April 2007, on the signature and provisional application of the Air Transport Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one hand, and the United States of America, on the other hand. With this Decision, the European Union approves the 'Open Skies' agreement concluded with the United States of America. The agreement provides for all transatlantic routes to be opened up to European and American companies. It also includes an arrangement to develop the agreement further on matters such as airline ownership.
[223] "Hubs versus Airport Dominance”, Bilotkach, V. and V. Pai. 2009.
[224] "Do European Carriers Charge Hub Premia?” Network and Spatial Economics, 4: (2004) 347-360. Lijesen, M. and P. Rietveld, 2004.
[225] See Non Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 91.
[226] When a ticket for an indirect journey is sold by a third party rather by one of the two carriers, the theory of harm would take the form of foreclosure through tying. It refers to a situation where IAG would avoid selling one leg of the indirect journey in isolation from the second one, thereby preventing the sale of indirect journeys combining a leg operated by IAG and one of its competitors on a given route.
[227] Non-confidential version of Air Canada's reply to question 22.1 of the Feeder Traffic Questionnaire.
[228] […]
[229] The criterion is that feeder traffic provided by the Parties to the service in question accounts for 3% of the total number of passengers, or the feeder traffic provided by bmi only accounts for 1% of the total number of passengers. In addition, only routes where IAG carried at least 10,000 passengers were considered. These thresholds are adequate to focus the Commission's analyses of routes where feeder traffic could be a material aspect of operations.
[230] According to the same dataset as that used to produce Table 39.
[231] See Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 34.
[232] Lufthansa's submission of 1 February 2012.