, Commission Decision of 30/03/2012 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the co…

In force

[212] Virgin's submission of 16 February 2012.

[213] The Proposed Acquisition of British Midland International's Mainline business by International Airlines Group: Economic considerations, Charles River Associates, 15 February 2012.

[214] This is a worst case scenario to assess the likely effects of the Transaction. Indeed, since IAG has been historically an active purchaser of slots and in view of the rules governing the allocation of slots from the pool, it can be reasonably assumed that in the counterfactual, the percentage of slots sold by bmi or bmi's liquidator that would end up with IAG would be larger than the percentage of slots falling back to the pool that would be allocated to IAG.

[215] Under the assumption that slot sales would be marginal, all bmi's slots would fall back to the pool except the security slots and the slots leased out to third parties, which together account for [30-40]% ([20-30]%+9%) of all bmi's slots. Therefore, the slots that would fall back to the pool would account for [60-70]% of all bmi's slots, out of which 20% would be allocated to IAG. The slots allocated to IAG via the pool would thus account for around [10-20]% (20% of [60-70]%) of all bmi's slots. Since IAG would acquire in addition the security slots, which account for [20-30]% of all bmi's slots, IAG would in total obtain [40-50]% ([20-30]%+[10-20]%) of all bmi's slots. In a case scenario where all leased slots would go back to the pool, IAG would obtain [40-50]% of bmi's slots, corresponding to around [0-5]% of the Heathrow slots. The conclusion of the Commission in recital 506 would not be affected.

[216] This is in any event a conservative assumption. Indeed, unlike many other airlines, IAG has been an active buyer of slots at Heathrow, including recently. Therefore, the more slots bmi would be able to sell in the counterfactual, the more slots IAG would be likely to acquire from bmi.

[217] Post-Transaction, the second slot holder would be the Lufthansa group with around 8% of the slots.

[218] It does not mean that on individual routes, other carriers than IAG could not enter or expand up to a level where they could exert some competitive constraint on IAG.

[219] By contrast, such indications of hoarding exist for bmi. Lufthansa has indicated that bmi entered on the Heathrow-Nice route primarily wirth a view to "warehousing" slots (Lufthansa's submission of 9 March 2012).