, Commission Decision of 30/03/2012 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the co…

In force
625.

On the contrary, in the post-Transaction situation, bmi's traffic rights would be inherited by the merged entity at least as long as IAG keeps bmi as a separate airline with its own operating license, and as long as the merged entity's traffic rights are not reallocated by the competent national authorities following a scarce capacity hearing.

626.

As a result it cannot be concluded that absent the Transaction bmi's traffic rights would inevitably exit the market.

4.

Overall causality criterion

627.

The overall criterion for assessing a failing firm defence is whether the proposed Transaction has to be considered to be the cause of the significant impediment of effective competition.

628.

In order to conclude that the Transaction is compatible with the internal market, it is necessary to establish whether the likely outcome(s) of the counterfactual would produce a deterioration of the competitive structure in the market to a similar degree compared to the merger. As explained in particular in Section V.1 about the reallocation of slots, the Commission has indications that absent the Transaction competition in the market would not deteriorate to the same extent as it would should the Transaction go through.

629.

First, the re-allocation of bmi's slots, in particular its large portfolio at highly congested Heathrow, would increase opportunities and incentives for entry and expansion by other airlines than IAG, in particular on the routes of concern. The same opportunities would not arise in the post-Transaction scenario.