The data provided by IAG [240] show that in a number of cases, IAG and bmi receive significant feeder traffic from competitors on the long-haul routes of concern that have a hub at the non-London end of the route. For example, in 2011, IAG and bmi received on their Heathrow-Johannesburgh route more than [0-50,000] connecting passengers as feeder traffic provided by South African Airways, whereas together they accounted for around [0-50,000] of the passengers connecting onto flights operated by South African Airways on the London-Johannesburg route. If IAG undertook a foreclosure strategy against South African Airways on this route, it would risk losing many connecting passengers on its London-Johannesburgh route. Moreover, a carrier operating from a hub has in principle access to plentiful feeder traffic at its hub and, for that reason, would be unlikely to be significantly weakened by a foreclosure strategy undertaken by IAG. IAG's incentives to engage in a foreclosure strategy targeting this kind of carriers thus appears limited
Therefore, the Commission considers that post-Transaction, IAG is likely to have the incentives to restrict access to its flights on some and possibly all the routes on which bmi currently operates for passengers connecting onto flights competing with IAG's services on certain routes, in particular the routes listed in table 39, in view of the importance of feeder traffic brought by the Parties to these routes. However, IAG's incentives to foreclose appear not be present in cases where it competes with a carrier having a hub at the non London end of the route.
3.3.3. Overall likely impact on effective competition
Anticompetitive foreclosure may occur when a vertical merger allows the parties to increase the costs of downstream rivals on the market thereby leading to an upward pressure on their sales prices. Significant harm to effective competition normally requires that the foreclosed firms play a sufficiently important role in the competitive process on the downstream market [241] .