This is particularly the case for the routes to Aberdeen, Edinburgh, and Manchester on which only the Parties currently operate, and which at the same time, appear as important routes in terms of provision of feeder traffic to other carriers at Heathrow according to the market investigation.
Besides, in view of the congestion prevailing at Heathrow, bmi's current competitors other than IAG would be unlikely to be in a position to easily add frequencies to accommodate needs for access to their flights for connecting passengers should IAG engage in a foreclosure strategy on routes where they currently compete with bmi.
To conclude with, as a result of the Transaction, IAG is likely to be able to hamper access to flights for passengers connecting at Heathrow on most of the routes currently operated by bmi.
3.3.2. Incentives to foreclose
IAG could deny or hamper access to its flights – or raise the costs [236] of such access - for passengers connecting onto flights operated by another carrier on a route where this carrier would compete with IAG. An objective could be to raise the costs incurred by other carriers in offering certain indirect journeys (e.g. Aberdeen-Los Angeles via Heathrow), which may allow IAG to raise prices for such indirect journeys. Another objective could be to divert away passengers from that competitor to IAG's own flights, with a view to increasing load factors but also to weaken that competitor and pave the way for price increases. For example, by applying such a foreclosure strategy on various "feeder routes" to passengers connecting onto services offered by a competitor on the Heathrow – Vancouver route (where IAG also operates ), IAG may reduce the number of passengers carried on this competitor's services between Heathrow and Vancouver. This competitor would then be weakened on this route and exerts less competitive pressure on IAG, thereby allowing it to raise prices, both for direct journeys out of Heathrow to Vancouver and for indirect journeys via Heathrow to Vancouver.