, Commission Decision of 30/03/2012 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the co…

In force
511.

Therefore, the assessment is the same no matter whether the two carriers are engaged in a vertical relationship or are active in closely related markets [225] , providing the "inputs" necessary to a sale of tickets for indirect journeys by a third party [226] . For the sake of simplification, the terminology of the input foreclosure theory will be used to conduct this assessment.

512.

In order for foreclosure to occur and harm competition as a result of the Transaction, the latter must confer on IAG the ability and incentives to engage in such foreclosure, or increase such ability and incentives, and foreclosure must be likely to significantly impede effective competition.

3.2. Concerns raised during the market investigation

513.

In the framework of the market investigation, serious concerns were expressed by certain long-haul carriers as regards the effects of the Transaction on feeder traffic. For example, Air Canada expects a decline in load factors on flights from Heathrow to Canada as well as possible reduced gauge for some of these flights [227] .

514.

[A third party], for its part, argued that IAG's foreclosure strategy would reduce rivals' ability to compete and would affect their viability [228] .

515.

Virgin argues that post-Transaction, the specific complementarities between bmi's flights into Heathrow that feed passengers and IAG's long-haul services are likely to be privileged at the expense of the complementarities that exist with the long-haul flights of IAG's rivals. According to Virgin, IAG would be able to use its strong position on several short-haul routes to capture customers on the long-haul routes, directly increasing the costs of indirect journeys with a long-haul segment operated by another carrier in competition with IAG, and reducing the viability of these competitors on the routes concerned and the constraint they exert on IAG.

516.

Virgin listed various mechanisms allegedly available to IAG to implement such strategy, notably the termination of special prorate agreements governing the sale of tickets for indirect journeys with one leg operated by IAG and the other leg operated by a competitor, or the manipulation of access to its seat inventories by IAG on its short-haul flights.