In its assessment of feeder traffic issues, the Commission has identified possible risks of restriction of access to feeder traffic even if an SPA is in place, in particular though punctual restricitions to seat inventories via revenue management systems. As already indicated, IAG has acknowledged that it would be technically possible. IAG could close a fare class for passengers connecting onto a competitor's services while leaving it open for passengers connecting onto its own services, without this being necessarily immediately apparent to the competitor in question.
However, the Commission considers that the Commitments reduce this risk to a sufficient extent. First of all, IAG is obliged, in the context of a Special Prorate Agreement entered into pursuant to the Commitments, to grant the applicant equivalent inventory access to that given within IAG. In addition, it shall not deconcur the other party to a Special Prorate Agreement from routes and fare classes covered by that agreement. Undue restriction or discriminatory access to its seat inventory would thus be a breach of the Commitments on the part of IAG.
Secondly, such conduct could be detected by the carriers that it would target. Virgin indicated that "it is possible to monitor discriminatory conduct in the way an airline manages access to a given flight for passengers connecting onto one of its other flights and for those connecting onto another airline's flight. However, this would be a very time consuming." [286] The fact that it would be time-consuming to do carry out such monitoring on a day-to-day basis is of little relevance. Indeed, a carrier which would be unsatisfied with the working of the Special Prorate Agreement and would have reasons to suspect a discriminatory conduct on the part of IAG (for example, if it realized that only a limited or abnormally low number of passengers connecting onto its flights could actually access IAG's "feeder flights") could investigate the issue.