, Commission Decision of 30/03/2012 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the co…

In force
480.

As regards the Manchester-Naples route, [0-50,000] passengers only travelled on this very thin route in the summer 2011 and winter 2010 IATA seasons combined, all of which flew indirect. Lufthansa has offered indirect services in recent IATA seasons on the city pair at issue and has a market share significantly higher than the ones of the Parties combined. Brussels Airlines and Air France/KLM have also offered indirect connections on the route in the most recent IATA seasons. Therefore a significant constraint would be exerted on the Parties post-Transaction on this route.

481.

Finally, it should be mentioned that no respondent in the market investigation mentioned the existence of any competition problem whatsoever on the indirect-indirect overlapping routes at issue.

482.

In view of the foregoing, the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market with respect to the indirect-indirect overlapping routes.

2.

IAG's position at London Heathrow

483.

After the Transaction, IAG would hold 53% of all the slots at Heathrow, whereas it currently holds 45% of them. In particular, this would enable IAG to offer more flights out of Heathrow. In the context of heavy congestion prevailing at Heathrow, the strengthening of IAG's already solid position at its main hub might have effects over and beyond the routes where bmi currently operates, as assessed in Sections VI.1 and VI.4.

2.1. Arguments put forward by Virgin and IAG

484.

In the context of the market investigation, Virgin argued that due to the Transaction, IAG would reinforce its presence at Heathrow and gain additional market power which would lead to various anti-competitive non-route specific effects [212] .

485.

Referring to literature on economics in the air transport sector, Virgin argues that carriers enjoying significant presence at a given airport may be able to charge a "hub premium" on routes from that airport – in other words, higher fares than they would otherwise set – due to various reasons.

486.

The first factor is the control over key inputs like boarding gates and slots usually enjoyed by carriers with large traffic volumes from a given airport. If these inputs are scarce, according to Virgin, control of a large share of them might allow incumbent operators to limit the scale of entry and expansion by potential competitors. As regards slots, this phenomenon is sometimes referred to as "slot hoarding".