, Decision_act (EU) 1995/547

In force

Through the 'better fortunes` clause, the State as a shareholder must be regarded as losing the dividends to which it would normally be entitled as a direct and indirect shareholder in CL (with 71 % of the share capital (17)) and as the tax collector. That is why CL's net contribution to the costs of the hiving-off mechanism is limited. Without the clause, the State would have received some 35 % of the profits in the form of taxation and 71 % of the amount available to shareholders (81 % of the profits), whereas, with the clause, it immediately receives some 47 % of the profits (18) and, in total, 90 % of the profits. At the same time, however, it loses some of the French taxes (approximately one sixth of the amount receivable under the clause) that it would otherwise have received. The surplus for the State arising from the clause is therefore 9 % of the profits, i.e. some FF 3 billion over twenty years (present value).

It is therefore clear that what the State gains on the one hand from the clause it loses on the other in taxation and normal dividends, except for that portion of the levy under the clause that the State raises [. . .]. However, the clause is an obligation producing a restraining effect on CL, all the more so since the levy under the clause is made before provisions for the fund for general banking risks.

Under the business plan, the present value of the levy under the 'better fortunes` clause and the present value of profits accruing to the State as a shareholder are estimated at FF 18 billion and FF 12 billion respectively.

However, the Commission takes the view that the business plan is based on somewhat optimistic assumptions (see point 6.2). The money-market rate is currently much higher than the rate used in the estimates in the business plan for 1995. Analysis of previous cases of bank recoveries and studies of banks' break-even points suggest that the recovery of a bank is often more difficult against a background of low inflation and high real interest rates than vice-versa. In addition, it would seem unlikely that CL will be able to reduce its overheads so quickly (18 % in four years), although this reduction is necessary if CL is to catch up its competitors. Lastly, it should also be noted that the model in the business plan from 2000-2014 is based on an assumption of automatic growth of profits after tax of 4 % per annum, which does not seem either realistic [. . .].