On the basis of the documents supplied, the Commission takes the view that the capital increase in May 1994 was unlikely at the time to ensure future viability. The capital increase must be regarded as having been essential for the bank's survival, since its solvency ratio had fallen below the 8 % minimum. However, the operation was not part of a [. . .] recovery plan for the bank.
In addition, the price of the increase seems to have been based on an overestimate of the bank's value. The French authorities have pointed out that the estimate had been certified by [. . .]. But there are several factors which suggest that a private investor would not have accepted that estimate as a basis for investing in CL.
Before subscribing fresh capital, a private investor would have called for a thorough study of CL's assets and accounts and for a detailed recovery plan; but [. . .], which was not asked to review CL's main assets, made its assessment on the basis of information supplied by CL, most of it a matter of public record, and was not put in a position to verify that information fully. Moreover, the value of the net assets was estimated on the basis of the 1993 accounts, which did not appear to reflect their real values, especially in the case of the industrial portfolio and the banking assets. A private investor would also have taken the view that some assets, particularly in the industrial portfolio, whose yield was lower than the cost of financing them, would be a burden on the bank's future profits. A further reduction in the value of the net assets could therefore have been deemed necessary.
Consequently, instead of being able to count on a reasonable return on its May 1994 investment without having to provide additional financing, the State has had to consider fresh financial support for CL.