After almost five years of rapid growth, CL recorded losses in 1992 (FF 1,8 billion) and 1993 (FF 6,9 billion). These were very heavy losses in proportion to CL's own funds, and its solvency ratio - the ratio of own funds to risk-adjusted assets - would have fallen below the 8 % legal minimum if the French authorities, acting at the request of the authority responsible for supervising the French banking system (the Commission Bancaire), had not taken financial support measures in 1994, essentially consisting of a capital increase and the underwriting by the State of certain non-performing assets. At the beginning of 1995 it became clear that CL would be recording further losses which would threaten its solvency; the French Government put together a new rescue package, involving the setting-up of another specific hived-off vehicle to take over FF 135 billion of assets, including CL's non-performing or poorly performing assets. The setting-up of this vehicle limited the accounting loss for 1994 to FF 12,1 billion.
The crisis affecting CL seems to be linked to a large extent to the bank's aggressive lending and investment policy in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, without there being sufficiently strict monitoring of exposure. Between 1988 and 1993 total assets almost doubled, while the value of CL's industrial portfolio increased almost five-fold to FF 50 billion. CL's assets on the property market exceeded FF 100 billion, placing the bank among the leading group of French credit institutions lending to property developers, with a higher proportion of business than was reflected in its position on the market. Furthermore, in an attempt to expand its activities in Europe and the rest of the world further, CL acquired a number of foreign banks at very high prices (for example, Chase Banque de Commerce in Belgium, Banco Comercial Español and Banca Jover in Spain, Credito Bergamasco and Banca Lombarda in Italy, BfG in Germany and Slavenburg Bank in the Netherlands).