In addition, Directive 89/647/EEC requires supervisory authorities to ensure that a bank whose solvency ratio falls below 8 % takes the necessary steps to restore the proper level as rapidly as possible, by recapitalizing or by reducing its liabilities, failing which it must cease activities. But such recapitalization and liabilities-reducing exercises may constitute State aid if they do not take place on normal market terms. Thus, the solvency ratio is a constraint which was imposed because it was felt that there was a minimum level of solvency below which a bank could not function soundly. The requirement is thus one of the tests of a bank's viability and, at the same time, ensures that banks compete with one another on an equal footing.
Accordingly, the conclusion must be that a market economy investor would not have agreed, as the French Government did in May 1994, to inject capital into CL at a price of FF 774 per share without a [. . .] study of the bank's accounts and without a [. . .] restructuring plan showing that CL would return to viability within a reasonable period. On the basis of the available information, therefore, the capital increase of FF 4,9 billion must be regarded as constituting State aid.
6.1.2. State guarantee as part of the first hive-off operation
Moving on to the State's underwriting of FF 18,4 billion as part of the 1994 hive-off, it must be concluded that there is a State aid component here too. In opening the proceeding, the Commission had taken the view, accepted by the French Government, that such cover was necessary to the survival of CL since otherwise the provisions needed would have exhausted the bank's reserves and rendered it insolvent. Without such cover, or some other operation on the same scale, CL would have had to go into liquidation.
In addition, there is no fixed risk premium on the guarantee, although there is a 'better fortunes` clause. Even so, given the overestimate of the non-performing assets and the fact that there was no certainty that there would be a return to better fortunes, that clause had no practical value. The overestimate meant that the provisions being underwritten were insufficient, as [. . .] stated in its report on CL, so that the guarantee would very likely have been taken up. Because the cover was necessary to the survival of CL and no return was expected, the aid component in the guarantee is practically equal to the cover extended.