In addition, there are grounds for concluding that the cost to the State would have been much lower if it had acted earlier. If the State had intervened to restrict CL's excessive growth, it would also have limited the risks to which CL was exposed, buoyed up by the substantial support provided by its shareholder, and hence reduced the final cost of rescuing CL.
It should be recalled here that CL's aggressive policy, which was not properly supervised, and the poor quality of its assets, had already prompted Moody's credit rating agency to reduce the bank's credit rating in 1991 to two points below the maximum. However, the credit rating still remained above the actual quality of CL's portfolio, since it received preferential treatment in the form of the guarantee provided by the State, which was the bank's principal shareholder.
Moreover, a number of elements had already alerted the French authorities at the start of 1992: the reversal in the economy, with its clear effects on CL's assets in the property and industrial sectors; the fragile position of CLBN, in particular because of its involvement with CL in the MGM affair; the consequences of stakes in loss-making publicly-owned companies such as Usinor-Sacilor; and the poor operations revealed by the Commission Bancaire's initial enquiries into a number of subsidiaries in the group, such as Altus.
Despite this, CL continued its [. . .] expansionist policy. The balance-sheet total rose from FF 1 600 billion (end of 1991) to almost FF 2 000 billion (end of 1993), an increase of 25 % in two years; half of this was accounted for by the takeover of BfG in Germany in December 1992. At the same time, CL strengthened its presence in America, Asia and Africa; the industrial and commercial portfolio, which was almost FF 38 billion at the end of 1991, was to reach some FF 50 billion by the end of 1993 (+30 %). It is clear, therefore, that closer supervision of CL's expansion would have limited the recovery costs. Accordingly, the rescue plan is late.