, Decision_act (EU) 1995/547

In force
III.

the plan will create serious competitive distortions which are not offset by any significant restructuring effort by CL. According to the complainants, the highly aggressive policy pursued by CL during the period from 1987 to 1993, and particularly its acquisition of banking and industrial holdings at very high prices, had already largely been financed by the State (through the transfer of almost FF 20 billion of capital, whereas self-financing accounted for less than FF 6 billion). Furthermore, through its disproportionate activity, CL has been a major factor in the worsening property crisis in France. Before the hiving-off operation, CL accounts for almost a third of total lending to property developers (FF 105 billion out of FF 324 billion), more than twice the total commitments of BNP and Société Générale, institutions of similar size to CL. In view of this, the conditions governing the plan's implementation impose few constraints, and CL's slimming-down exercise is purely a possibility given that the rationalization measures taken in France by CL are of the same type and scale as those of its competitors (e.g. in 1994 the workforce employed by CL in metropolitan France fell by 2 % over the same area of activity, compared with a reduction in BNP's workforce in metropolitan France of 2,3 %) (9);

IV.

the following corrective measures should therefore be envisaged:

1.

the management of CDR should be independent in order to prevent any possible conflict of interest (the capital, the managing bodies and the staff should be totally independent of CL);

2.

Altus, SDBO and Colbert should remain part of the CL group (which should itself bear the costs connected with the liquidation of those banks);

3.

there should be a ceiling on the State guarantee;

4.

the State operating subsidy provided for CL, which stems from the substitution in CL's accounts of the hived-off non-profitable assets by the SPBI loan, should be greatly reduced;

5.

the carrying-over of tax losses should be cancelled;

6.

the 'better fortunes` clause must be locked in for the period initially planned (20 years), whether CL is privatized or not;

7.

CL should sell substantial parts of its operations, both within and outside Europe;

8.

CL's commitments should be clearly specified and identified and should be irrevocable; furthermore, an annual public report should provide details of the application of the plan.