In addition, it should be noted that this operation took place some three years after the change in the economic situation in this sector. During that period, CL had made [. . .] no provisions against the assets acquired, which nonetheless continued to increase, while a number of experts estimated that provisions should have been made against a [. . .] proportion of the property loans.
The Commission had also rejected the argument put forward by the French Government that such cover did not constitute State aid because it had been provided by shareholders at the request of the Commission Bancaire and formed part of a hiving-off mechanism which has also been used by other French banks. Indeed, there are other special features which distinguish CL's case from that of other French banks which have adopted similar hiving-off mechanisms. First, CL made no significant losses on the nominal value of the assets transferred to OIG, because the State had underwritten the risks of the new vehicle by virtue of the transfer of the assets at their net book value, and the provisions made by CL were almost negligible in relation to the nominal value of the assets.
It would also seem, from the information received, that, among such hiving-off mechanisms, CL's special vehicle OIG is the only one whose risks are underwritten by the State. That cover enabled CL to keep those liabilities in its books in 1994 without needing to make additional provisions or reconstitute its own funds, as required by the rules on the solvency of credit institutions. The other French banks do not seem to have been given the same advantage: they had to set up special companies outside the scope of their consolidated accounts and the risks were covered through their own financial holding companies and not by their ultimate shareholders.
The payment of FF 4 billion to CL for servicing the loan made to the special vehicle seems peculiar to the mechanism in CL's case. Payment of this carrying cost clearly has to be considered State aid additional to the aid constituted by the cover itself.
It must be concluded, therefore, that there is substantial State aid in the hiving-off mechanism, and particularly in the State's underwriting of the risks attaching to the assets transferred and of the loan-servicing costs.
6.1.3. Second hive-off operation