5.8. Experience shows that total numbers of refugees, displaced persons and other people needing humanitarian assistance tend initially to be overstated. Several factors influence this: the difficulty of assessing actual numbers when large movements of population occur, coupled with inadequate resources being allocated to the task of drawing up initial estimates, inflationary pressure on numbers from the media and from within the humanitarian agencies themselves, and in some cases the need for political authorities affected by the crisis to exaggerate the situation.
5.9. In former Yugoslavia, the assessment of needs was relatively straightforward in Croatia, Serbia/Montenegro and FYROM (70), but was very difficult in Bosnia because of the problems of access to the areas where the refugees and displaced persons were located. The extent to which they could cope without external assistance was not well understood. During the winter of 1993/94 the agencies were frequently denied access to the areas where the refugees and displaced persons were located, and were able to deliver only about 50 % of the targeted food requirements. The affected population, although suffering hardship as reflected in a decrease in average weights, high rates of anaemia, etc., managed to cope. This led the UNHCR and the WFP to revise downwards their estimates of needs. In mid-1994 the estimated number of people in the former Yugoslav republics reported by the WFP as receiving food assistance was reduced from approximately 4,1 million to 2,9 million persons. Of this reduction of 1,2 million, 0,9 million were accounted for by the reduction of numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2,8 million to 1,9 million persons. This latter figure was used up to the end of 1995 as an overall planning estimate of total beneficiaries on which to base resource requirements.