, Special Report No 2/97 concerning humanitarian aid from the European Union between 1992…

In forcesince 20 Feb 1997
b)

whilst the framework partnership agreement and its operational contract are well suited in their present form to simple humanitarian aid measures which basically involve procuring, delivering and distributing supplies, they are less able to satisfy the requirements of complex major operations which form part of longer-term programmes involving several donors. Similarly, whilst the very detailed budgets are in keeping with what may reasonably be expected for simple operations, this level of detail is, however, ill-suited to complex measures which call for a certain amount of flexibility. Whilst it is quite legitimate to want to ensure that the expenditure incurred corresponds to categories which have been authorized beforehand, it is going too far to try to stipulate the supplies too precisely, as this complicates the partner's action;

c)

it is not realistic to take the attitude that the partner must in every case adapt to the donor's conditions because the latter holds the purse strings. This in fact runs contrary to the aim of sound financial management. The aid recipients either have to perform accounting contorsions which ECHO can detect only by means of on-the-spot checks, or they put ECHO in a fait accompli situation, safe in the knowledge that, because of their size and their political weight, they are key partners;

d)

whereas in the framework agreement ECHO's partners undertake to follow certain procedures for individual measures, ECHO for its part makes only undertakings of a general nature. Thus, for example, ECHO does not specify the level of financing which its partners can expect, the time-limits within which they will obtain a response to their proposals or the explanations which will be given to them in the event of their proposals being altered;

e)

some of the accounting methods applied by the ECHO departments are not very explicit and result in cases where ECHO refuses to bear expenditure even though there is no question as to the availability of the appropriations or the relevance of the expenditure. The following aspects of the framework agreement should therefore be explained more clearly: the detailed rules for applying the flat rates, especially for staff expenditure (see paragraph 4.22), the mechanisms for using the contingency reserves, the arrangements for reviewing the budgets and the procedures for converting advances and expenditure (48);