The decision to entrust the management of the programmes to an external body is unquestionably a decision of principle, which implies important choices regarding the way in which a policy is to be implemented. Such a decision may only be taken by the Members of the Commission (1) together, and must necessarily lay down precise provisions governing the procedures for delegating the powers in question, in particular as regards the question of scrutiny and the responsibilities incumbent on the delegates.
In its reply to the observations of the Court, the Commission argues that 'the arrangement [with ARTM] flows from the financing decisions taken for the MED programmes adopted by the Commission'. These decisions, however, are insufficient and do not define the conditions under which ARTM is to exercise powers delegated by the Commission.
Conditions of delegation
Lastly, the Court of Justice, in its ruling in re Meroni v. the High Authority of 13 June 1958 (which has since become the standard case-law reference for such matters), lists the conditions that must be satisfied if power is to be delegated in a regular manner. One of these conditions states that discretionary power may not be delegated, and that only clearly defined powers of implementation may be delegated. However, it was noted that the utilization by the Commitment Committees of the reservations contained in the Commission`s financing decision had resulted in the de facto amendment of several decisions (see paragraphs 73 to 74 below). An irregularity was therefore committed, either because the Commitment Committees had overstepped its powers or because the Commission had delegated the discretionary power of amending a decision. This power cannot be described as a clearly defined power of implementation.