, Special Report No 1/96 on the MED programmes together with the Commission's replies

In forcesince 30 May 1996
39.

In view of the nature and scope of the powers conferred on the ARTM, what the Commission had actually done was to delegate its powers de facto to a third body, rather than sign mere service contracts. The fact is, though, that (ignoring the questions concerning the legal basis, see paragraph 41 below) these powers were delegated in the absence of a decision of principle by the Commission (see paragraphs 42 et seq.). The terms of this delegation are also open to criticism, in so far as the contracts remain vague as to the responsibility of the ARTM and its administrators and say nothing about the ownership of its assets and their sharing out in the event of bankruptcy, although the ARTM was set up exclusively with finance from the Commission. Furthermore, the Court observed serious irregularities in the way this delegation was managed (see paragraphs 44 to 45 below).

40.

Lastly, in spite of several warnings, this de facto delegation of powers was not revoked, in spite of the fact that, in a note of 2 December 1992, the Commission`s Legal Service, having been consulted by the department responsible for the implementation of the MED programmes, pointed out that: 'control-related duties, or those involving the discharge of discretionary power within the framework of a genuine Community policy, including the implementation of the budget, may be carried out only by officials or, under certain circumstances, temporary staff' (2).

Legal basis

41.

The legal basis for this delegation of powers is not clear. Whilst Article 105 (3) (1) of the Financial Regulation (FR), which concerns the management of external aid in general, provides for the possibility of delegating management 'to another body', in contrast, Article 6 (1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1763/92, which covers the MED programmes in particular, does not mention any such possibility. Although this Regulation refers explicitly to Article 105 of the FR, it allows the Commission to delegate its management powers only to the EIB, as regards interest rate subsidies and operations based on risk capital.

Competent authority

  • celex=31992R1763
  • celex=31992R1762