, Special report No 7/93 concerning controls of irregularities and fraud in the agricultur…

In forcesince 9 Dec 1993

2.36. In order to check whether the goods were declared in the correct quantity, under the correct export refund classification and that they were delivered to Algeria and placed on the market there, within the framework of the call for tender on the advance fixing certificate, an audit had to be carried out by the Court in Germany, Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The audit revealed that the managing director of the undertaking in France was also the beneficial owner of the undertakings in the United Kingdom and Switzerland; that none of the deliveries had been made within the framework of the call for tender on the advance fixing certificate; and that of the 15 Mio ECU refunds involved more than 2 Mio ECU had been irregularly paid.

2.37. When the Court reported the case to the Member States concerned, Germany replied that it could take no action because it was a matter of the irregular issue of the certificate in France, and France replied that it was entirely a matter for Germany because it was a case of misuse of the certificate. The Commission has since requested the recovery of the amount involved in the misuse of the licence in question from the German undertaking. However, the Commission has not sought to extend its follow up action to other licences issued to the same undertaking.

2.38. The Court invited the French authorities on 12 February 1992 to extend the enquiry to cover other certificates issued to the French undertaking. A reply was received on 25 March 1992 indicating that the enquiry was under way. In fact, this enquiry did not commence until March 1993 as a result of further contacts between the Court and the French authorities.

Communication of background to scrutiny requests

2.39. No Member State gives any background information on the undertakings when making requests. It is particularly important when specific information is available concerning suspected frauds or known risks, that all relevant information be communicated to those who have to carry out the scrutiny.

2.40. Only the Netherlands, had identified certain undertakings for scrutiny as a result of its pilot risk analysis but where such undertakings had to be scrutinized in other Member States, the perceived risks were not communicated.

Reporting and follow up