Subsequently, in late July 1995, it was realized that the conversion of special loans into grants would not take effect until it was formally approved by the parties to the Convention, or at least the Member States. Consequently, a decision-making procedure of the representatives of the Member States' Governments meeting in the Council was introduced and completed on 20 December 1995.
The ECU 9.2 million commitment caused the grant-aid element of the Malawi NIP for the sixth EDF to be exceeded temporarily. This overrun disappeared when the special loans were converted into grants (in December 1995) before closure of the accounts.
When the financing decision was taken, the sum of the 'other grants` allocation provided for in the third Lomé Convention was sufficient to cover the Commission's commitment to Malawi. Strictly speaking, the actual allocation for Malawi was therefore not exceeded.
The knowledge that the special loans would be converted into grants and would therefore correct the overrun for Malawi meant that there was no need to take any further corrective action.
3.69. The Commission does not concur with the Court's view that underlying operations in respect of commitments for interest rate subsidies on EIB financing decisions are irregular on the grounds that the accounts do not conform to the rules.
The Convention, the Internal Agreement, and the Financial Regulation place the Commission under no such obligation. Article 60(3) of the Financial Regulation merely stipulates the way in which the EIB is to calculate interest rate subsidies.
1.The Lomé Convention charges the EIB with the management of interest rate subsidies and venture capital (Article 1(2) of the Financial Protocol to the fourth Lomé Convention).
This legal stipulation is incorporated into Article 10(2) of the Internal Agreement, which states that '... risk capital and interest rate subsidies financed from the Fund's resources shall be administered by the Bank on behalf of the Community...`.
It should be noted that the Bank acts not on behalf of the Commission, but on behalf of the Community.
The decision-making and implementing procedures to be followed by the EIB are set out in the Internal Agreement. Nowhere in the Agreement is the Commission given specific duties with regard to the management of risk capital or interest rate subsidies. The Commission is responsible only for the funds which it manages.