, Decision_act (EU) 1999/508

In forcesince 14 Oct 1998

The independent auditor evaluated the guarantee against tax risks at FRF 123 million, and this figure was given to those allowed to inspect the documentation. The draft contract given to those prospective buyers asked each of them to indicate the amount of the guarantee it required against unrevealed liabilities and inaccurate statements. The buyer who made a firm offer evaluated the guarantee for unrevealed liabilities and inaccurate statements at FRF 300 million.

In view of SMC's financial position, and the fact that its real provisioning requirements have been underestimated in the past, it is reasonable for a buyer seeking to determine the amount that should be covered by a guarantee of this kind to be particularly prudent. The Commission considers, therefore, that this valuation of the guarantee is justified, and that the aid component is equal to the amount guaranteed. The tax risk was evaluated by the independent consultant at FRF 123 million; in view of the uncertainty of the precise determination of the risk, there should be a margin of variation of 10 % up or down in the value of the guarantee covering it. The Commission should accordingly set the maximum State aid authorised by way of guarantee at FRF 435,3 million.

In their letter of 21 April 1997, the French authorities observed that these capital injections were the solution least costly to the State as shareholder.

The Commission accepts, indeed it is convinced, that the confidence of depositors and markets in the sound operation and stability of credit institutions must be maintained. Respect for market discipline, with the possibility that structurally unprofitable credit institutions may be penalised and in some cases pushed out of the market, is one of the foundations of that confidence. To keep alive institutions which have no prospect of recovery provokes serious distortion of competition, raises a problem of moral hazard, and ultimately renders the rest of the banking system more fragile. It also seriously distorts the allocation of funds, and thus leads to lopsided development in the economy as a whole.

In a market economy, shareholders will as a rule support an economic activity if it has sufficient prospect of profitability in the long term. Conduct of that kind will usually be compatible with the private investor principle.