52 3. ASSESSMENT, Decision_act (EU) 2021/534

In forcesince 24 Mar 2021cited 1×

Regarding the third potential cause indicated by the German authority that could lead to the vertical distance dropping to 0,5 m, due to the potential failure of the limit switch, Orona explained in its observations of 18 May 2016 that the technician stands on the roof of the car, duly switches on inspection mode on the controller and thereby takes sole control over the lift. The technician then moves the car in the direction of the top of the well. The control system may fail. Due to this failure, the lift continues to move but still only at 0,6 m/s (inspection speed). Even in the case of uncontrolled movement upwards (‘UCMP’), the speed of 1 m/s (normal mode speed) would not be surpassed. The possibility that the technician stops the lift immediately in case of a danger by means of the two emergency limits on the controller remains unchanged. Even if the technician does not operate the emergency stop for unascertainable reasons, the final limit switch will ensure that the lift stops with a minimum free space of 1 m, without any risk of crushing. Therefore, also in this case, the overall probability of serious injury in the M33v3 lift is close to zero and the risk is the same as in a lift compliant with EN 81-1. For those reasons, the human error and the failure of the limit switch cannot be considered as causes leading to the vertical distance dropping to 0,5 m instead of 1,8 m when the M33v3 lift works properly.

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