, Special Report No 17/98 on support for renewable energy sources in the shared-cost actio…

In force

6.7. Although differences between the Member States and the Commission as to the degree, methods or priorities of support for RES are substantial, they must not influence the Commission's measures. However, where a Member State's objectives are opposed to the Commission's objectives, this must be taken into account. In the case of support to grid-connected photovoltaic installations by THERMIE, the success of these installations very much depends on the political will, within the Member States, to allow the installations on the electricity grid and to offer favourable electricity buy-back rates. In one of the Member States visited the national policy was against grid-connected PV-installations. Under such circumstances it appears inappropriate for THERMIE to support such installations, as the chances that the demonstration will be replicated on a large scale are too low.

6.8. A notable difference between the Commission's and the Member States' support measures is that while THERMIE continues to provide grants for demonstration projects, national support is increasingly taking the form of fiscal incentives, soft loans and guaranteed electricity buy-back rates. Although these incentives are often not limited to innovative installations, they create favourable conditions that stimulate innovation. Considering the success of specific schemes, such as the guaranteed buy-back rate for wind-generated electricity in several Member States, the possibility of a harmonisation of successful incentive schemes throughout the European Union could be envisaged. The Commission's report to the Council and the European Parliament (20) on the requirements for harmonisation of incentives to RES within the internal electricity market is a first step in this direction.

7.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. A general conclusion as to the success or failure of Altener and the RES component of JOULE-THERMIE cannot be reached because the overall objectives were insufficiently precise to be used as benchmarks against which the actual outcome of the programmes can be assessed. The absence of clear and quantified objectives increases the risk that a programme will be continued for an extended period regardless of its real economic value or potentiality (see paragraph 3.09).

  • Judgment of the Court of 24 October 1989. Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities.Decision

    24 Oct 1989 · 61988CJ0016

  • num:eu=1993/500