, Special Report No 8/98 on the Commission's services specifically involved in the fight a…

In forcesince 10 Jun 1998

2.12. Moreover, even supposing that all the new instruments were ratified in the short term, a series of measures still have to be taken to enhance the legal basis of the anti-fraud policy. The discontinuity of legal procedures and the disparity between the different Member State systems of criminal justice, notably in terms of the severity and nature of punishment, hinder the effective repression of fraud (9). There is a need for 'radical response to the absurdity, still tolerated though universally condemned, of opening wide our national frontiers to criminals while continuing to shut them against those responsible for fighting crime, despite the risk of turning our countries into crime havens` (10).

Fraud prevention

SEM 2000

2.13. Together with the Member States the Commission embarked on a wide-ranging three-stage exercise, named SEM 2000 (standing for Sound and Efficient Management 2000), to make the management of Community appropriations more efficient. The first two stages involved the Commission improving the standard of its own financial management. The third stage aims to bring about improvements in the management of Community resources by the Member States.

'Fraud-proofing` of legislation2.14. In this context the Commission adopted in 1996 internal measures with the aim of fraud-proofing legislation and decisions that have direct or indirect financial implications (11). The complexity and opaqueness of much existing Community legislation makes the EU budget particularly vulnerable to fraud. The necessary changes in the legislation will require a sustained effort over a long period.

Early warning system in the field of direct expenditure2.15. The Commission started, in July 1997, a project which has as its objective the introduction of an early warning system in case of administrative errors or fraud committed by organisations or enterprises receiving direct funding from the Commission (12). It is too early for an evaluation of its effectiveness.

Setting priorities

2.16. UCLAF needs a basis for deciding which cases should receive priority in the allocation of the limited resources for inspections to sensitive areas and 'high-risk` operators and/or recipients. This in turn requires criteria for optimising the use of the diverse information at the disposal of the unit. UCLAF concluded, on 8 December 1995, an administrative arrangement with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) to carry out a study on: