It is indeed extremely unlikely that, given the well-known legal risks, any written resolution would nowadays be made recording the details of such an understanding. There are many forms and degrees of collusion and it does not require the making of a formal agreement. An infringement of Article 85 may well exist where the parties have not even spelled out an agreement in terms but each infers commitment from the other on the basis of conduct.
The definition of the Court of Justice of a concerted practice as set out in its judgment in Suiker Unie is thus entirely apt to cover the commercial behaviour of ICI and Solvay.
The Commission therefore finds that the continued division of national markets between Solvay and ICI results from and is referable at least to a concerted practice.
Restrictions of competition/effect on trade between Member States (60) Arrangements between producers which have the object or effect of protecting national markets are expressly prohibited by subparagraph (c) of Article 85 (1). Such protection is in fundamental conflict with one of the basic objectives of the Treaty, namely the creation of a common market. Given the size of the two undertakings concerned and their importance in the market for soda-ash, there can be no doubt that the arrangement had an appreciable effect upon trade between Member States.
B. Remedies and sanctions 1. Article 3 of Regulation N° 17 (61) Where the Commission finds that there is an infringement of Article 85, it may require the undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation No 17.
The arrangements in the present case were conceived and implemented in secret and both undertakings have continued to deny the existence of any infringement of Article 85. As a result, it is uncertain whether or not they have definitively put an end to the collusion. It is therefore necessary, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 17, to require ICI and Solvay to bring the infringement to an immediate end.
The parties must also be prohibited from any agreement or concerted practice having equivalent effect.
Article 15 (2) of Regulation N° 17 (62) Under Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may by decision impose on undertakings fines of from ECU 1 000 to ECU 1 million, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 85 (1) or Article 86. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard is to be had to both the gravity and the duration of the infringement.
Gravity (63) In the present case the Commission considers that the infringement was of considerable gravity. Over a long period of time the two major producers of soda-ash in the Community have knowingly concerted their commercial policies so as to avoid all competition between them in an important industrial product and a market worth some ECU 900 million annually. But for the discovery of the relevant evidence by the Commission, there is every likelihood that they would have continued their anti-competitive cooperation in some form for an indefinite period.