As regards the possibility of trade in the opposite direction, the major container glass customers in the United Kingdom are relatively favourably located in terms of access from continental western Europe. The pricing comparisons obtained at the producers themselves show that it would have been perfectly feasible for Solvay to have delivered to customers particularly in the east and south-east of England.
The absence of trade in soda-ash is in direct contrast with the present competitive environment in caustic soda, a product which is comparable in price but more expensive and more hazardous to ship.
Nor is the argument about 'customer preference` for a local supplier persuasive. It is difficult to accept that glass manufacturers in the United Kingdom 'preferred` to pay 15 to 20 % more for their major raw material than their competitors in continental western Europe. There is also abundant evidence that ICI was concerned that its container glass customers in the United Kingdom might be driven to seek sources of cheap ash in continental western Europe.
It is significant that since the institution of the proceedings in the present case, Solvay has started quoting to customers for delivering in the United Kingdom from Germany at prices which are competitive with those of ICI.
PART II LEGAL ASSESSMENT A. Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 1. Article 85 (1) (52) Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty prohibits as incompatible with the common market all agreements between undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, and in particular those which directly or indirectly fix purchase prices or any other trading conditions and share markets or sources of supply.
Agreement/concerted practice (53) The main issue for present purposes is whether the rigid market separation and absence of competition between Solvay and ICI is the result of express or tacit collusion between them or whether it is the result of their independent business judgment.
The market separation has its origins in an express agreement (the 'Alkali cartel`, 'Page 1000`, etc.). Although that agreement has formally been terminated, the factual separation envisaged therein has continued up to the present: Solvay and ICI do not compete with each other in any Community market.