The vital significance of the PFR arrangements in terms of maintaining the rigid division between Solvay's and ICI's respective 'spheres of influence` is apparent from an ICI memorandum of 17 September 1982. Capacity reduction to a point where ICI could not cover United Kingdom demand was seen as bound to lead to a change in the perceptions both of customers and other producers. ICI's concern was to maintain its control over the United Kingdom market and prevent any perception that its 'sovereignty` had been weakened by the planned capacity reduction. Under the heading 'Market Control` the memorandum continues:
'Opportunities could be developed to "manage" capacity reduction in such a way as to maintain market control. For example, a purchase for resale (PFR) deal might be struck with a co-producer to meet the deficit or export markets such as South Africa might be traded off against the expectation of orderly behaviour in the United Kingdom.' Judged in the light of the above document, the importance of the PFR arrangements with Solvay becomes clear. The 'status quo` (in particular ICI's dominance of, and Solvay's abstention from, its United Kingdom 'home market`) is maintained while in return Solvay under the 'trade off` has the commercial benefit of substantial PFR sales to ICI on a long-term basis.