The reasons for the continuing separation of markets as between Solvay and ICI in soda-ash are said to be purely commercial considerations. It makes sense (it is said) for each producer to concentrate its sales on its natural 'home market` within which it has a natural competitive advantage. Transport costs for soda-ash are relatively high in relation to the final selling price, and this factor, combined with customer preference for a local source with long-term security of supply, has led to a natural separation of markets along geographical lines. In the case of the United Kingdom in particular the requirement for a sea-crossing accounts for the insulation of the market in both directions.
Since 1980 the price of soda-ash in the United Kingdom has been higher than in continental western Europe. It would be absurd (says ICI) for it to offer the product to customers in continental western Europe markets where not only is the market price lower but it would have to undercut the existing supplier. The transport costs from the United Kingdom would be prohibitive: in support of this proposition ICI has provided freight tables in which the cost of road transport to northern France is estimated at some £ 40/tonne, almost 40 % of the net selling price. (During the oral hearing however ICI admitted that this cost would be halved if a depot were established in France and supplied by coaster.) (43) In addition ICI and Solvay point to the risk of 'retaliation` in the event of a competitive incursion by one into the market of the other. If one producer displaced the other at a particular customer, the affected supplier would have no alternative but to seek to place the lost tonnage elsewhere, the most likely market being the aggressor's own home market; ultimately each would end up selling the same tonnage but both would incur greater costs and generate lower profits. The reason the two producers do not aggressively market in each other's home markets is thus said to be an awareness that such an exercise would generate a price war from which neither would gain.
According to ICI and Solvay, theirs is purely an 'arm`s-length' relationship. While ICI insists that their meetings were concerned only with legitimate matters, Solvay does however acknowledge that on occasions executives on both sides may have attempted to go further and obtain information of a more confidential nature but this, it is said, does not point to concertation.
The economic survey produced by ICI (44) An economics expert commissioned by ICI to produce a report for the purposes of the proceedings concluded that, given the structure and conditions of the soda-ash industry, the producers could by expected to concentrate on their home markets and refrain from competition with one another without any collusion. This market equilibrium is explained by reference to the 'Cournot` model which is characterized by the expectation of undertakings in an industry that other undertakings will maintain output whatever change the individual makes (1). ICI also sought to explain oligopolistic behaviour in the industry in terms of the 'theory of games' (2). According to ICI the rigidity of the market is the result of a 'non-cooperative game` in which each producer recognizes the risk of retaliation and to avoid the risk becoming a reality tries to maintain a stable market position. The 'alternative solution` in theory that margins could be improved still further by the undertakings acting together as a monopolist, is dismissed by ICI on the grounds that (a) it would not work in an industry with falling sales, and (b) the potential rewards were not sufficient to overcome the difficulties involved in cooperation. A theoretical model is however only as useful as the information it is used to analyse. The economics expert admitted during the oral hearing that she had not even seen the documentary evidence annexed to the statement of objections. Given the express terms of 'Page 1000`, it is wholly inapt to explain the historical separation of markets in terms of a 'non-collaborative game`. Similarly the documentary evidence of consultation between ICI and Solvay so as to reduce uncertainty as to their responses to the other's behaviour, which is inconsistent with the theory of 'non-collaboration`, was also ignored. The conclusion of the report that the structure of the industry and the conduct of the producers was referable to a non-collaborative strategy was thus reached without consideration of the relevant evidence.
Factual assessment (45) On the basis of the above factual and economic evidence, the Commission does not accept that the strict market division between Solvay and ICI which is a characteristic of the soda-ash market in the Community results from the operation of natural market forces or the independent commercial judgment of the two producers.
It considers on the contrary that the market separation is the subject of a continued understanding between the two producers and based on the mutual recognition of each other's exclusive sphere of influence or zone of operations.