The granting of the aid is to be regarded as incompatible with the common market pursuant to Article 92 (3) (c) of the EC Treaty. The waiving of debt and the granting of counter-guarantees were out of proportion to the expected benefits from the Community's point of view and paved the way for undue distortions of competition based on predatory pricing.
Under point 3.2 of the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, restructuring aid is admissible if there is a restructuring plan that fulfils the following requirements:
Restoration of viability
The privatization plan would not lead to the restoration of the long-term profitability and viability of SKET SMM within a reasonable time-scale on the basis of realistic assumptions.
The investor's plan was based on the assumption that, without major restructuring of costs (stable personnel costs, increase in already excessively high material costs), sales could be increased by nearly 35 % between 1994 (DM 282 million) and 1997 (DM 418 million).
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Annual losses (DM 120 million in 1996) were to be reduced so dramatically that in 1997 a DM 7,4 million profit would be booked. Similarly, the negative cash flow of DM 101,6 million in 1996 would be reduced to minus DM 4,5 million in 1997.
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The assumption of increasing sales under future operating conditions was questionable to say the least, even if unprofitable production was to be abandoned, due to dependence on the CIS market (high political and economic risk) and the modernization backlog. Even if such an outcome were feasible, the company was likely to require further injections of public money at the end of the restructuring period because the projected result would not have been sufficiently high given the heavy losses incurred the previous year. In the privatization contract itself it was assumed that, by the end of the restructuring period in 1998, SKET SMM would have accumulated heavy losses.
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Avoidance of undue distortions of competition