The incentives of Tetra as a minority shareholder would change as a result of Tetra's financial interests in Sidel. Such financial interest would give Tetra the right to receive a proportion of the profit stream generated by Sidel from its operations and investment. In the absence of any shareholding in Sidel, Tetra would seek a profit maximising outcome solely on the basis of the expected profit stream generated by its own operations. By retaining a stake in Sidel, Tetra would be likely to take into account its expected revenue stream generated by its financial interests in Sidel and would therefore be likely to consider how its actions would affect Sidel's profit stream. The incentives of Tetra to compete would therefore be changed as a result of the minority shareholding. For example, it might be in Tetra's interest to increase/not to decrease its carton prices although this might induce increased switching to PET by customers, if Tetra could capture both the increased carton profits from retained customers and compensate the loss of carton profits from switching customers by benefiting from a proportion of the increase in Sidel's profits resulting from increased demand for PET, whereas such a strategy would not be attractive in the absence of a shareholding in Sidel. The high levels of concentration in the closely related markets for carton and PET equipment, with Tetra and Sidel enjoying, respectively, dominance and a very strong position, facilitates such a strategy.
Recital 37, Decision_act (EU) 2004/103
In forcesince 30 Jan 2002