It is not strictly necessary, for the application of Article 85 (1), given the overtly anticompetitive object of the agreement, for an adverse effect upon competition to be demonstrated.
However, in the present case the evidence shows that the agreement did in fact produce an appreciable effect upon competitive conditions.
The agreement in meetings of target prices for each grade and national currency was implemented by the producers all issuing price instructions to their national sales offices or agents which then had to inform customers of the new price levels.
The customers were thus faced as a result of these concerted price initiatives with a uniform basic price in each currency for each major grade. Individual customers might benefit from special conditions or discounts and some producers might delay the planned increase or make concessions. Some producers might fix their actual prices for some grades or in some countries slightly below the targets while still determining such prices in the context of a general move by all the other producers ('shaving' the cartel
price). The setting however of a particular price level which was then presented to the market as 'the list price' or 'the official price' meant that the opportunities for customers to negotiate with producers were already circumscribed and they were deprived of many of the benefits which would otherwise be available from the free play of competitive forces.
The documentary evidence, including the market reports of the producers themselves, thus shows the existence in the market place of concerted price initiatives involving all producers and the close link between these initiatives and the system of regular meetings.
It is true that the achieved price level generally lagged behind the 'targets' and that price initiatives tended to run out of momentum, sometimes eventually resulting in a sharp drop in prices. However the graphs relied upon by the producers themselves show a regular pattern over the years of close parallel movement of target and actual levels. During the period covered by known price initiatives the price achieved each month moved up toward the agreed target. When there was a sudden price 'collapse' (for example, when propylene prices fell) this was arrested by fixing a new and much lower target and the upward trend was re-established. The success of such a tactic was particularly marked in July to November 1983.