BDS fails in its counter-argument that dealers receiving the new price lists can choose whether to align themselves with the major dealers' policies or ignore them. It is sufficient for the purposes of Article 65 (1) of the Treaty if the firms concerned are influenced in favour of uniform pricing. This goes without saying in the present case, since it cannot seriously be denied that the knowledge of the pricing behaviour about to be adopted by the most important firms provides the other steel stockholders with valuable information with which they can determine their own pricing policy. Even a system of "guide prices" affects normal competition since it enables all the participants to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty what the pricing policy pursued by their competitors will be (2).
Furthermore, Article 65 (1) is applicable despite the fact that the stockholders generally do not keep to their list prices, but give discounts on these prices or else use them as a guide for setting prices to be charged on individual dealings. Collective practices which lead to indirect price-fixing are also covered by the prohibition. This applies as soon as essential price components are artificially approximated in such a way as to place effective selling prices on a level differing from that which would result from a competitive situation. This artificial price level need not necessarily be adhered to by all the firms involved. For the purposes of Article 65 (1) price competition need not be completely suppressed ; the provision applies as soon as competition between a number of undertakings is restricted or distorted.