On compliance with Article 22(3) of the Electricity Regulation, the Commission notes that the competitive nature of the allocation process (see recitals (10), (11) and (13)) and the design of the auction curve (see recital (14)) ensure that the auction clearing price tends to zero if enough capacity is present on the market, in line with the requirements in point (a). In addition, the existing mechanism includes a secondary market to ensure that capacity obligations are transferable between eligible capacity providers, in line with point (c). The requirement in point (b), namely that the capacity mechanism must remunerate the participating resources only for their availability and ensure that the remuneration does not affect decisions of the capacity provider on whether or not to generate, is fulfilled for the reasons set out in recital (113) above.
115 5. ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUESTED DEROGATION › 5.3. Article 64(2c) of the Electricity Regulation › 5.3.1. Article 64(2c) point (a): Primary auction processes (main and additional auctions) › Compliance of primary auctions with Article 22 of the Electricity Regulation, Decision_act (EU) 2026/341
In forcesince 11 Aug 2025