Finally, the Spanish authorities themselves indicate [See in particular paragraph 11 of the Spanish authorities comments on third party observations submitted on 27 July 2016.] that according to Article 9 of Law 12/1981 in case the operator does not comply with its obligations, the Administratión de la Generalitat can forcefully execute these measures at the costs of the operator. They indicate that in practice the administration implements the relevant measures that are then financed from the financial guarantee or, in case the guarantee is not sufficient, from the sale of assets of the operator. Therefore, in case the financial guarantee is significantly lower than required, the public administration runs a risk that the assets of the operator are not sufficient to finance the relevant measures it executed. This confirms that a too low financial guarantee increases the risk that the restoration measures taken by the administration will not be sufficiently covered by the assets of the operator (especially in case it does not have any other Spanish activities as in case of Iberpotash) and would need to be paid from the public resources.
98 5. ASSESSMENT OF THE AID › 5.1. EXISTENCE OF STATE AID › 5.1.1. MEASURE 1: REDUCED LEVEL OF THE FINANCIAL GUARANTEES › 5.1.1.2. Transfer of State resources, Decision_act (EU) 2018/118
In forcesince 31 Aug 2017cited 1×
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 16 January 2020. Iberpotash, SA v European Commission.Decision
In recitals 92 to 99 of the contested decision, the Commission states that the increased risk that State resources might be affected in the future stems from the amount of the guarantees being significantly lower than any expected …
16 Jan 2020 · 62018TJ0257