BPI |[0–5]% |[0–5]% |
Austrian Post |[0–5]% |[0–5]% |
Total |100% |100% |
Source: Market Investigation and Form CO
As can be seen from the above table, La Poste accounts for [70-80%] of the market; Swiss Post's French subsidiary has about [0-5]% of the market. Through the proposed transaction, La Poste would therefore gain direct and indirect control of nearly [80-90]% of the market in terms of value.
Parties' arguments
The Parties have argued that the creation of the JV will not raise serious doubts on this market for various reasons:
the Parties will contribute only one of their two French outbound mail activities to the JV (i.e., the French subsidiary of Swiss Post). La Poste will continue to be active on this market on its own. The Parties want to ensure that the JV will be managed independently from the Parties by setting up "Chinese walls" between the JV and the Parties;
the French subsidiary of Swiss Post is a minor player on the French outbound mail market. The creation of the JV would therefore not lead to substantial changes in the competitive structure of the market;
the French subsidiary of Swiss Post specifically targets high value clients; therefore there is significant competition for these clients in order to offer an alternative to the incumbent La Poste;
customers do not face any switching costs on the French market; and lastly
barriers to entry are low on this market. [17]
Assessment
Based on the results of the market investigation and general legal considerations, the Commission, however, does not agree with this reasoning. First, based on previous practice, the Commission disagrees with the Parties assertion that because the JV will be managed independently La Poste and the JV will be looked at as independent market operators. La Poste would have control over both its own business and, indirectly, the JV's and could therefore at any time align the strategic conduct of the two entities.