However, according to Alcoa, what distinguishes the SGA market from that standard bidding model is the fact that suppliers are constrained as to capacity. The market is in balance, and all suppliers can and do sell their production. The parties claim that as a consequence of this market situation the price in any given tender is close to the average cost of the bidder with the highest cost. No low-cost producer would ever forsake his higher profits by submitting a bid close to his nearest rival. The Commission accepts that, in the market scenario described by Alcoa, in each of the three to four tenders that take place each year bidders have to take into account the likely bids submitted by their rivals. In bids involving Darling Range plants (Wagerup and Pinjarra for Alcoa, and Worsley for Reynolds), which produce at approximately the same level of costs, price could be set more competitively. Indeed, in these tenders it is very likely that these firms will set their price at a level lower than that set in situations where only high-cost bidders participate. This is because prior to the merger Reynolds cannot be punished, as it has sufficient capacity to reply Capacity constraints affect the degree of competition in two ways. First, a capacity-constrained firm has little incentive to deviate - a competitor with low extra capacity will not gain much from undercutting its rivals since it will not be able to participate in many other bids - and has no chance to impose a very impressive threat of retaliation against potential deviators. Following the merger, the immediate result of the elimination of one of the most efficient active potential bidders would thus be an increase of the equilibrium price in those bidding rounds where Darling Range plants were closely involved. The final effect would be an increase of the average bidding price.
Recital 54, Decision_act (EU) 2002/174
In forcesince 3 May 2000