Recital 44, Decision_act (EU) 2002/174

In forcesince 3 May 2000

Alcoa/Reynolds' control over the low and high-cost refineries, including expansion possibilities in combination with its veto rights, would make the following strategy successful: the merged firm could delay brownfield expansion and at the same time close parts of its high-cost capacity to keep the market tight, leading to supra competitive prices for smelter grade alumina. In turn, the merged firm could maintain supra-competitive prices, as it could credibly act in such a way as to deter entry if any entry is motivated by the inflated price levels. The mere announcement of expansion on the part of the merged firm would have an impact on the market price for alumina, and as a result expansion business plans by other competitors would have to be reviewed in the light of future alumina prices. This would be in particular the case where the required return on investment of a third party expansion would not be achieved, as a result of depressed future alumina prices.