Recital 124, Decision_act (EU) 2002/174

In forcesince 3 May 2000

On the basis of the above analysis, the Commission considers that the proposed concentration has the effect of changing the output incentives of one of only two active actual P0404 suppliers, namely Reynolds. As a result of the merger, the merged firm may act independently of its competitor, Southwire, or its customer, McCook, by increasing the P0404 prices or refusing to sell. In each case, the P0404 price will increase at supra competitive levels. In the event that the merged firm raises the prices of P0404, Southwire (which is dependent on the merged firm for its alumina supplies) will not compete aggressively against the merged firm on the price, but is more likely to follow the price increase. In the event that the merged firm refuses to sell, Southwire will be able to charge supra-competitive prices. Therefore, whether or not present in the market, the merged firm will be able to control the supply conditions of P0404. The Commission therefore considers that the concentration creates a dominant position held by the merging parties, as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in this market.

Vertical effects in the market for aerospace aluminium alloys