3.6. The selection of projects for which subsidised loans will be granted, and the checking of the projects' eligibility, are tasks that are usually entrusted to the EIB. The Commission, which on occasion has no knowledge of the projects or the final beneficiaries, is thus faced with a fait accompli. Decisions to grant subsidies may also be taken by the Commission on the basis of information provided by the EIB, but in practice this merely involves the Commission rubbberPstamping the proposals submitted to it by the EIB(25).
3.7. Similarly, when the Commission receives reports from the EIB concerning the progress of investments under way, which is not always the case, they are not analysed. The Commission's interest in these documents is all the less as it believes that it is unnecessary to repeat the work already done by the EIB, that the main risk connected with these operations is that of loans not being recovered, a matter that is meticulously monitored by the EIB and, lastly, that the cost to the budget in these cases is often relatively low, especially in cases where subsidies are accompanied by other more costly measures.
Effectiveness of the subsidies
3.8. In the case of most measures the subsidy rates bear no direct relation to market rates, which vary greatly over time and according to the country concerned, and are not based on an analysis to determine the threshold above which the subsidy is likely to be truly effective.
3.9. As far as most of the measures involved are concerned, the objectives are defined in an extremely general manner. This being the case and in the absence of costed objectives, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the objectives have actually been achieved.
3.10. In practice, the Commission is content to draw up a list of projects implemented and sums spent. In general, the Court believes that a high utilisation rate is not synonymous with effectiveness In fact, the success (which is different from effectiveness) of this type of aid is not only dependent on, inter alia, its appeal to final beneficiaries, but also its attractiveness to financial intermediaries. But the latter promote such aid in the light of their own interests (for example, to attract worthwhile new customers or develop the loyalty of existing customers), which, while not conflicting with them, are not necessarily the same as the EU's objectives.