, Special Report No 3/99 on the management and control of interest Prate subsidies by the…

In forcesince 16 Jun 1999

3.2. The amount of aid actually received by final beneficiaries is determined by the behaviour of the financial intermediaries, who may retain part of the subsidy by manipulating the level of the interest rate or other features of the loans they propose (such as fees, exchange rates or value dates). There is a risk that these intermediaries' remuneration will exceed that stipulated and that the aid intended for beneficiaries will be reduced proportionately, in contravention of the regulations.

3.3. However, where the Commission has delegated the management of interest subsidies, it does not check the terms governing the loans in cases where they are paid out by financial intermediaries and, moreover, generally does not even possess the information needed for this purpose. Furthermore, the fact that interestPrate subsidies may not be paid out by all members of the banking system, but only by a restricted number of intermediaries selected by the EIB, is likely to affect competition within the sector.

3.4. In cases where loans are directly backPtoPback with borrowings, the spread between the rates needs to be checked. In the case of ECSC loans, all the benefits the Commission gains in its capacity as a firstPclass borrower, including cases where it is able to obtain more advantageous refinancing for operations already under way, are passed on to its own borrowers. The EIB enjoys margins on the loans it grants from its outside borrowings that are not subject to auditing by the Court. No provision is made in the contracts for the terms to be adjusted to enable borrowers to benefit from more advantageous terms in the event that market conditions improve.

3.5. As regards loans financed from the EIB's own resources, the rates for such loans are not compared with those in the market. Given that the EIB enjoys special privileges(22) and has a monopoly over the allocation of certain subsidies, the competition mechanism does not guarantee that its margins are in accordance with the regulations laid down in its statutes(23). This matter also has a bearing on the volume of administrative expenditure that is reinvoiced(24) by the EIB in respect of its management of operations under mandate from and on behalf of the Commission. Observations were made in this regard in the Court's Annual Reports concerning the financial years 1994 (paragraphs 8.36 to 8.43) and 1993 (paragraphs 10.26 to 10.30).

Eligibility and followPup of projects entrusted to the EIB