Recital 114, Decision_act (EU) 1994/601

In forcesince 13 Jul 1994

The Commission rejects the argument of some producers that there was no element of volume control. The whole basis of the cartel - and which indeed ensured its success - was the 'price before tonnage' policy for which there is ample documentary evidence.

M-M's insistence that the producers attending cartel meetings accepted no 'commitment' as regards their future behaviour is totally at odds with its own internal accounts of what occurred and the mass of other documentary evidence as well as the invariable pattern of the price increases which had earlier been fixed in meetings of the PG Paperboard being announced by all the participants. The conscious and voluntary commitment of the participants to a common scheme is well established. For its part, M-M's senior management habitually gave strict orders to the sales force that the price increases were to be implemented without exception.

It is also idle for certain of the other producers (e.g. MoDo, de Eendracht) who attended JMC or even PWG meetings to contend that the documented phenomenon of the industry price initiatives in which all producers took part between 1987 and 1991 were the result not of collusion but of natural market forces; their unsupported assertions are wholly against the weight of the documentary evidence of price fixing in the meetings of the PG Paperboard. The argument of some producers that they were merely following price increases of which they had legitimately acquired knowledge through press reports or from seeing letters from their competitors can similarly be rejected. It is of course true that price increase letters originating from competitors were found at a number of producers, but set against the direct evidence of collusion this does not provide an 'innocent explanation' for the close parallelism in pricing behaviour. In any case, it was clear that on some occasions at least they had been obtained from competitors directly, not from customers. Further, it was common practice for some producers to wait for firm proof that the others had already 'moved' before finally committing themselves to a planned price increase. Price increase letters from competitors provided such proof (second Stora statement, p. 17). In fact, the producers who were in possession of price increase letters from their main competitors were deeply involved in the JMC, PWG or both and can hardly claim to have been ignorant of their activities.