As regards the pricing study produced by the firm of economic consultants, its evidential value is limited when set against the documentay evidence of price fixing and market sharing obtained by the Commission. The author of the report frankly accepted during the oral hearing that his findings in no way disproved the existence of cartel.
If the purpose of the economic study was simply to show that the cartel was ineffective, it does not fulfil this objective either. The Commission never alleged that the actual prices charged went up by the full amount of the proposed increase to all customers on the first day the new prices became effective and it would be unrealistic to expect that they would (see recitals 101 and 102). The various graphs in the economic study commissioned by the producers (and on which they rely to support the argument that there was no causal connection between 'announced' and 'actual' prices) (16) in fact show a close linear relationship between the two sets of data, both in absolute domestic currencies and converted to ecu in real terms (see recital 21). The net price increases achieved closely tracked the price announcements albeit with some time lag. The author of the report himself acknowledged during the oral hearing that this was the case for 1988 and 1989. It is only to the expected that when account is taken of individual arrangements, discounts and concessions on timing - and sometimes general customer resistance - the actual net increases achieved should be somewhat lower than those announced. The use of 'average' increases also tends to obscure the fact that in many cases the producers succeeded in making the customer pay the full amount of the announced increase.
Arguments by various producers regarding the extent of their involvement in the infringement will be dealt with in the next section.
H. THE INVOLVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCERS (116) It is necessary to establish as against each addressee of this Decision that it participated in the infringement. This does not, however, as some undertakings have argued, require direct proof that every alleged participant expressly gave its consent to, or committed some overt act in support of, each and every individual aspect or manifestation of the cartel throughout its duration. Reasons of both substantive law and practicality militate against such a fragmented approach.
The whole gravamen of the infringement lies in the combination of the producers over several years in a joint unlawful enterprise pursuant to a common design. Price collusion and volume control were inextricably linked aspects of the same overall plan. It is fully accepted by the Commission that by their very nature the market sharing arrangements (particularly the freezing of shares described in recitals 56 and 57) involved primarily the major producers. There is no indication, however, that individuals could select the aspects of the cartel in which they wished to join and opt out of others. Even the smaller producers were involved in the exercise of monitoring order backlogs which was essential to judging whether conditions were appropriate for a concerted price increase. Nor are individual price initiatives to be considered as a series of discrete infringements; rather they involve the implementation of the same overarching agreement.
Some undertakings argued that there was no express documentary evidence that they had actually participated in one or other price initiative or that their available documentation only showed price increases in some national markets and not in others. Others (who were members of the PWG) said that whatever the plan might have been or whatever others had done there was no proof that they had themselves restricted their output. These arguments were advanced in an attempt to diminish the responsibility of the undertaking concerned in the operation of the cartel.
Once, however, its membership of the cartel is demonstrated over the period in question, the degree of responsibility of a participant cannot be determined simply on the basis of how much direct documentary evidence of its own actions happened to be discovered. By its very nature, the cartel was a clandestine activity. Considerable efforts were made to conceal its existence and to ensure (not always successfully, however) that incriminating evidence was not kept. There could be no question in such a case of rewarding those who are most successful in frustrating the efforts of the investigating authority. Quite apart however from any deliberate concealment of evidence, the extent and availability of relevant routine pricing documentation for the relevant period showing the implementation of different price initiatives by each producer is a largely adventitious circumstance. In some cases documents had simply not been kept or were no longer available for particular markets or for a particular period.