The parties have also submitted that the Commission has no proof of actual restrictions of competition resulting from the Exchange and that on the contrary an analysis of the past performance of companies on the United Kingdom market shows changes in market shares which are not reconcilable with the anticompetitive effects of the Exchange alleged by the Commission in the Statement of Objections. This argument cannot be accepted either.
The nature of the information exchanged and the detail of that information is such that it creates a degree of transparency in a highly concentrated market shielded from outside competition (high entry barriers, virtually no extra-Community imports) which necessarily leads to a reduction of competition between the competitors operating on that market.
In addition, account must be taken not only of the immediate visible effects on an agreement but also of its potential effects and of the fact that an agreement can create a structure likely to be used for anticompetitive purposes.
Article 85 must be interpreted as including potential anticompetitive effects because the objective of that provision is the maintenance of an effective competitive structure within the meaning of Article 3 (f). This objective is particularly material in a highly concentrated market where an information exchange creates a structure of transparency which prevents hidden competition and increases barriers to entry for non-members.
As to the changes in the market shares, it first needs to be pointed out that the overall United Kingdom market shares for the participants in the Exchange have remained relatively stable during the existence of the Exchange. However, fluctuations in market shares have taken place at national and local levels. These variations in themselves do not exclude a lessening of competition on the United Kingdom tractor market as a result of the Exchange. In order to be restrictive of competition, the Exchange does not need to create an absolute stability of market shares or exclude even fierce competition in certain areas. In the present case, the anticompetitive effect of the Exchange lies in the fact that, for the reasons explained above, it can be said with sufficient certainty that the market shares and market positions of the members would have been different in the absence of the Exchange and are likely to be different in the future if the Exchange does not continue. However, to provide proof of actual differences is impossible in practice. In this case, it is the economic context, the structure of the market and the nature of the information exchanged which all lead to the conclusion that a lessening of competition as a result of the Exchange is inevitable.